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We consider finite games in strategic form with Choquet expected utility. Using the notion of (unam-
biguously) believed, we define Choquet rationalizability and characterize it by Choquet rationality
and common beliefs in Choquet rationality in the universal capacity type space in a purelymeasurable
setting. We also show that Choquet rationalizability is equivalent to iterative elimination of strictly
dominated actions (not in the original game but) in an extended game. This allows for computa-
tion of Choquet rationalizable actions without the need to first compute Choquet integrals. Choquet
expected utility allows us to investigate common belief in ambiguity love/aversion. We show that
ambiguity love/aversion leads to smaller/larger Choquet rationalizable sets of action profiles.
1 Introduction
We consider finite games in strategic form with Choquet expected utility. Using the notion of (unam-
biguously) believed, we define Choquet rationalizability and characterize it by Choquet rationality and
common beliefs in Choquet rationality in the universal capacity type space in a purely measurable setting.
We also show that Choquet rationalizability is equivalent to iterative elimination of strictly dominated
actions (not in the original game but) in an extended game. This allows for computation of Choquet ratio-
nalizable actions without the need to first compute Choquet integrals. Choquet expected utility allows us
to investigate common belief in ambiguity love/aversion. We show that Choquet rationality and common
belief in Choquet rationality and ambiguity love/aversion leads to smaller/larger sets of action profiles.
The closest paper related to ours is Battigalli et al. (2016), who show elegantly that more ambiguity
aversion expands the set of rationalizable actions in the family of smooth-ambiguity preferences.
Choquet expected utility theory was probably the first approach to decision making under ambi-
guity (Schmeidler, 1986, 1989). It has been applied to a variety settings including portfolio choice,
auctions, arbitrage pricing, incomplete contracts, risk sharing, insurance contracts, incomplete markets,
public goods, search, wages, peace-making, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, trade, agreement theorems
etc. Compared to some other approaches, it is flexible enough to allow for modelling of both ambiguity
aversion and ambiguity love. Moreover, since it does not feature probability measures, it forces us to con-
ceptually reconsider standard notions of game theory that were historically developed with probability
measures in mind.
Applying Choquet expected utility to games is not new. Dow and Werlang (1994), Eichberger and
Kelsey (2000, 2014), Marinacci (2000), Haller (2000), Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2009), Do-
∗We thank Amanda Friedenberg, Fabio Maccharoni, and three anonymous reviewers. Some of the material was developed
in an earlier unfinished project of Amanda and Burkhard a couple of years back. All errors are the sole responsibility of Adam
and Burkhard.
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miniak and Eichberger (2019) apply Choquet expected utility of Schmeidler (1989) to games.1 While
these papers extend formal definitions of Nash equilibrium to games with Choquet expected utility, it
is less clear that also the interpretations of Nash equilibrium extend to games under ambiguity. For in-
stance, how to interpret independence of conjectures over opponents’ play? And how can mutual belief
(under ambiguity) of conjectures be learned when learning under ambiguity is itself a conceptually diffi-
cult problem. Our approach is to focus on extending rationalizability a` la Spohn (1982), Bernheim (1984)
and Pearce (1984) to games with ambiguity and characterize it by common belief in Choquet rationality.
That is, we avoid the issue of independence of conjectures by allowing for “correlated” conjectures (in
particular, whether or not players are correlated may be a source of ambiguity in games). Moreover, we
assume mutual belief in Choquet rationality rather than mutual belief in play.
Applying rationalizability notions to games with preferences that allow for ambiguity is also not
new. In a truly seminal paper, Epstein (1997) introduced a general utility representation-based notion of
rationalizability, that applies to various decision theories including essentially2 Choquet expected utility.
Although this important paper has been around at least since 1997, we could not find any application
of it. Perhaps one reason is that a rationalizability notion featuring the utility representation may be of
limited accessibility to applied game theorist familiar with rationalizability a` la Bernheim (1984) and
Pearce (1984) and with iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions. That’s why we introduce the
analogues of rationalizability and iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions for Choquet expected
utility. Altogether we define six “versions” of Choquet rationalizability and show their equivalence. This
allows applied game theorist to choose the version they find most easy to work with and at the same time
refer to the interpretations of other versions.
The interpretation of Choquet rationalizability is made transparent with an epistemic characterization
by common belief in Choquet rationality. That is, we introduce a capacity type space that then allows us
to formalize the set of types who are consistent with k-level belief in Choquet rationality and common
belief in Choquet rationality. In order to characterize Choquet rationality by common belief in Choquet
rationality, we first require a “rich” capacity type space. This universal capacity type space is derived
from the existence of a Choquet expected utility representation type space which in turn is based on
results by Ganguli, Heifetz, and Lee (2016).
As this is just an extended abstract we omit many details, all proofs, and discussions and refer the
interested reader to a full version instead.
2 Decision Theoretic Set-Up
Let 〈Ω,ΣΩ〉 be a measurable space Ω endowed with a σ -algebra ΣΩ. An element ω ∈ Ω is called state;
an element E ∈ ΣΩ is called event.
Definition 1 (Capacity) A capacity on ΣΩ is a set-function ν : ΣΩ → R that satisfies
(i) Normalization: ν( /0) = 0, ν(Ω) = 1, and
(ii) Monotonicity: For all E,F ∈ ΣΩ, E ⊆ F implies ν(E)≤ ν(F).
Let X be a set of outcomes, a compact subset of R. An act is a ΣΩ-measurable map f : Ω → X (i.e.,
f−1(x) ∈ ΣΩ for all x ∈ X ). An act is simple if it can take only finitely many values. Throughout the
1Klibanoff (1996), Lo (1996, 1999), Aryal and Stauber (2014), and Riedel and Sass (2014) apply the maxmin expected
utility. Battigalli et al. (2016) and Hanany et al. (2019) use the smooth-model.
2We are not aware that the version of Choquet expected utility applied by Epstein (1997) had been already developed in
1997.
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paper, we assume that any act is simple without extra saying so.. This is w.l.o.g. since we focus on
finite games. We denote a simple act by f = (E1,x1; . . . ;En,xn) where E1, . . . ,En is a finite partition of
Ω such that f (ω) = xi for all ω ∈ Ei and i = 1, . . . ,n. We denote by F the set of all (simple) acts. A
constant act yields the same outcome in all states. For any event E ∈ ΣΩ and acts f ,g ∈F , fEg denotes
the (composite) act defined by
fEg(ω) =
{
f (ω) if ω ∈ E,
g(ω) otherwise.
We denote by % a preference relation on F ; ≻ and ∼ are the asymmetric and symmetric parts of %,
respectively.
Let u : X → R be a utility function, ranking constant acts. The Choquet expected utility of an act f
with respect to u and ν is calculated via the Choquet integral (see Choquet, 1954). More precisely, the
Choquet integral of any act f = (E1,x1; . . . ;En,xn) such that u(x1)> u(x2)> .. . > u(xn) is given by
∫
Ω
u( f )dν =
n
∑
i=1
u(xi)
[
ν
( i⋃
j=1
E j
)
−ν
( i⋃
j=1
E j−1
)]
, (1)
with convention that E0 = /0.
We assume that each % on F has a Choquet expected utility representation. Formally,
Definition 2 (Choquet Expected Utility) A preference % on F admits a Choquet expected utility rep-
resentation if there exist a utility function u : X −→ R and a capacity ν : ΣΩ −→ R such that for all acts
f ,g ∈F :
f % g if and only if
∫
Ω
u( f )dν ≥
∫
Ω
u(g)dν . (2)
Moreover, ν is unique and u is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
The family of Choquet expected utility preferences has been characterized in terms of properties on
preferences in various decision theoretic settings.3
Instead of using some notion of support of a capacity to represent “belief” in an ad hoc way as in
some prior work on ambiguity in games, we define a preference-based notion of (unambiguous) belief.
Definition 3 (Belief) An event E ∈ ΣΩ is said to be %-null if, for all acts f ,g,h ∈ F , fEh % gEh. An
event E is %-believed if Ω\E is %-null.
While a preference-based notion of belief is conceptually important when “importing” decision the-
ory into game theory, in applications it is useful to characterize belief at the level of capacities.4
Proposition 1 Let  be a Choquet expected utility preference with respect to a capacity ν on ΣΩ. The
following statements are equivalent:
(i) Event E ∈ ΣΩ is %-believed.
(ii) ν((Ω\E)∪F) = ν(F) for all events F ∈ ΣΩ, F ⊆ E.
(iii) ν(G∪F) = ν(F) for all F,G ∈ ΣΩ with G⊆ Ω\E.
3Chateauneuf (1994), Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2003), Chew and Karni (1991), Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Mari-
nacci and Siniscalchi (2003), Gilboa (1987), Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2003), Nakamura (1990), Sarin and Wakker (1992),
Schmeidler (1986, 1989), and Wakker (1989).
4This result comes from an earlier unfinished project of Amanda Friedenberg and Burkhard.
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From now on, we take statement (ii) quasi as a definition of belief. While our notion of belief goes
back essentially to subjective expected utility a` la Savage (1954), it has also been used by Epstein (1997),
Morris, (1997), Ghiradato and Le Breton (1999), and Chen and Luo (2012) when considering preferences
allowing for ambiguity in an interactive setting. This notion of belief is closely related to the preference-
based notion of “unambiguous events”. More precisely, if an event is believed, it is an unambiguous
event in the sense of Sarin and Wakker (1992) and Nehring (1999). An event E ∈ ΣΩ is unambiguous if
% satisfies the Sure-Thing Principle constrained to E and Ω\E . The following definition is due to Sarin
and Wakker (1992).
Definition 4 (Unambiguous Event) An event E ∈ΣΩ is said to be%-unambiguous if, for any f ,g,h,h
′ ∈
F ,
fEh% gEh if and only if fEh
′ % gEh
′, and
fΩ\Eh% gΩ\Eh if and only if fΩ\Eh
′ % gΩ\Eh
′.
Otherwise, E is called %-ambiguous.
The following characterization extends Dominiak and Lefort (2011, Proposition 3.1) to the measur-
able case.
Proposition 2 Let  be a Choquet expected utility preference with respect to a capacity ν on ΣΩ. An
event E ∈ ΣΩ is %-unambiguous if and only if, for any F ∈ ΣΩ,
ν(F) = ν(F ∩E)+ν(F ∩ (Ω\E)). (3)
Condition (3) says that the capacity ν is additively-separable across unambiguous events. Intuitively,
one would expect that there is a close relationship between additivity of a capacity and unambiguous
events. However, as pointed out by Nehring (1999), we know that the standard additivity condition is not
sufficient for an event to be unambiguous (unless the capacity is convex or concave). We have examples
illustrating that additivity of a capacity w.r.t. to an event does not imply that this event is perceived
unambiguously.
We have that an event is believed if and only if it is an unambiguous event with the capacity value 1.
Proposition 3 Let  be a Choquet expected utility preference with a capacity ν on ΣΩ. The following
statements are equivalent:
(i) Event E ∈ ΣΩ is %-believed.
(ii) Event E is %-unambiguous with ν(E) = 1.
(iii) Event Ω\E is %-unambiguous with ν(Ω\E) = 0.
We have but do not report here results relating our notion of belief to notions of support of a capacity
that have been previously used in lieu of belief in the game-theoretic literature on Choquet expected
utility in games.
3 Choquet Rationalizability
Fix a finite strategic game form 〈I,(Ai)i∈I ,(oi)i∈I〉, for which I is a nonempty finite set of players and
for each player i ∈ I, Ai is a nonempty finite set of actions and oi : A−→ X is the outcome function with
A := ×i∈IAi that assigns to each profile of actions a ∈ A an outcome oi(a) in the previously introduced
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outcome space X . As usual, for any collection of sets (Yi)i∈I we denote byY =×i∈IYi andY−i=× j∈I\{i}Yj
with generic elements y and y−i, respectively.
Next we connect Choquet expected utility theory to games in strategic form. Given a strategic game
form 〈I,(Ai),(oi)〉, for any player i ∈ I and any action ai ∈ Ai we denote by f
ai : A−i −→ X the act of
player i associated with action ai defined by f
ai(a−i) := oi(ai,a−i). The set of opponents’ action profiles
A−i takes on the role of the state space in Choquet expected utility theory signifying the fact we model
strategic uncertainty. The strategic game form 〈I,(Ai),(oi)〉 together with the utility functions (ui)i∈I
over outcomes in X define a game in strategic form 〈I,(Ai),(ui ◦oi)〉.
Let νi be a capacity on A−i. We say that a
∗
i ∈ Ai is a Choquet best response to νi if
a∗i ∈ argmax
ai∈Ai
∫
A−i
ui(oi(ai,a−i))dνi(a−i), (4)
where the integral is the Choquet integral defined above.
Denote by C (A−i) the set of all capacities on A−i.
Definition 5 (Choquet rationalizability) For i ∈ I and k ≥ 1 define inductively,
C1i = C (A−i)
R1i =
{
ai ∈ Ai : there exists νi ∈C
1
i for which aiis a Choquet best response
}
...
Ck+1i =
{
νi ∈C
k
i : νi((A−i \R
k
−i)∪F) = νi(F) for all F ⊆ R
k
−i
}
Rk+1i =
{
ai ∈ Ai : there exists νi ∈C
k+1
i for which ai is a Choquet best response
}
The set of Choquet rationalizable actions is
R∞i =
∞⋂
k=1
Rki .
Choquet rationalizability is defined as a reduction procedure on sets of capacities. It implies a reduc-
tion procedure on sets of actions for each player.
Remark 1 For i ∈ I and k ≥ 1, Rk+1i ⊆ R
k
i .
Theorem 1 (Existence) For any finite game in strategic form, Rki 6= /0 for k ≥ 1 and R
∞
i 6= /0 for all i ∈ I.
Alternatively we can consider a “fixed-point” definition suggested verbally in the last section of
Ghirardato and Le Breton (1999, p. 15).
Definition 6 (Fixed-point definition) Define (Ri)i∈I with Ri ⊆ Ai for i ∈ I to be the largest set such that
every ai ∈ Ri is a Choquet best response with respect to a capacity νi ∈C (A−i) satisfying νi((A−i\R−i)∪
F) = νi(F) for all F ⊆ R−i.
Remark 2 If (Ri)i∈I and (R˜i)i∈I are two collections of sets, each satisfying Definition 6, then Ri = R˜i for
all i ∈ I.
The fixed-point definition of Choquet rationalizability is equivalent to the inductive definition.
Theorem 2 For any finite game in strategic form, Ri = R
∞
i for all i ∈ I,.
This result parallels the equivalence of the fixed-point definition and inductive definition of standard
rationalizability a` la Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984).
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3.1 Iterative Dominance in Extended Games
Choquet rationalizability is a reduction procedure on beliefs represented by capacities. In applications
it is sometimes easier to use a reduction procedure on actions instead. Moreover, the computation of
Choquet expected utilities may be viewed as an impediment to applications of Choquet expected utility
theory in games. Fortunately, we can characterize Choquet rationalizability by an iterated elimination
procedure akin to iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions a suitably extended game that does
not require the computation of the Choquet integral.
Definition 7 (Extended Game) Given a game in strategic form G = 〈I,(Ai)i∈I ,(ui ◦ oi)i∈I〉, we define
an associated extended game G = 〈I,(Ai)i∈I ,(u˜i)i∈I〉 in which the set of players is the set of players
I in the underlying game G, player i’s set of actions Ai := 2
Ai \ { /0} is the set of nonempty subsets of
actions of the underlying game G, and player i’s utility function u˜i :A −→ R is defined by u˜i(A
′
i,A
′
−i) =
mina∈A′i×A
′
−i
ui(oi(a)) for all (A
′
i,A
′
−i) ∈A := ×i∈IAi.
We like to stress that we view the extended game as a technical device that facilitates computing
Choquet rationalizable actions without the need to compute Choquet expected utility in games. Although
we do not champion this interpretation, one may interpret the extended game as a game in which players
can chose ambiguous actions in the sense of choosing non-singleton subsets of actions.
A subset Y ⊆ A is called a restriction of player i (or an i-product set) if Y =Yi×Y−i for some Yi ⊆ Ai
and Y−i ⊆ A−i. Clearly, A itself is a restriction for every player i ∈ N. Given a restriction Y = Yi×Y−i
of player i in the game G, the associated restriction in the associated extended game G is defined by
Y = Yi×Y−i where Yi = 2
Yi \{ /0} and Y−i = 2
Y−i \{ /0}.
For each player i ∈ I, let A ◦i ⊆Ai denote the subset of singleton subsets in Ai. These are the actions
in the extended game that actually correspond to actions in the underlying game.
Definition 8 (Strict Domination in Extended Games) A subset of actions A′i ∈Ai is strictly dominated
in player i’s restriction Y ⊆A by a mixed action in the extended game G if A′i ∈ Yi, Y−i 6= /0 and there
exists ai ∈ A
′
i for which there exists a mixed action αi ∈ ∆(Yi∩A
◦
i ) such that
u˜i(αi,A
′
−i)> u˜i({ai},A
′
−i) for all A
′
−i ∈ Y−i,
where ∆(Yi∩A
◦
i ) denotes the set of probability measures on Yi∩A
◦
i and (with some abuse of notation)
u˜i(αi,A
′
−i) is player i’s expected utility from playing the mixed action αi when i’s opponents play A
′
−i in
the extended game.
Definition 9 (Never Choquet Best Response) We say that an action ai is never a Choquet best response
on player i’s restriction Y if there does not exist a capacity νi ∈ C (Y−i) for which it is a Choquet best
response.
The following lemma is the analogue to Pearce (1984, Lemma 3) for Choquet expected utility.
Lemma 1 Given a finite game in strategic form G = 〈I,(Ai)i∈I ,(ui ◦ oi)i∈I〉, action ai ∈ Ai is never a
Choquet best response on player i’s restriction Y if and only if {ai} is strictly dominated in player i’s
associated restriction Y of the associated extended game G = 〈I,(Ai)i∈I ,(u˜i)i∈I〉.
The proof is based on Ghirardato and Le Breton (1999, Theorems 1 and 2).
Definition 10 (Iterated Strict Dominance) For every player i ∈ I and every of player i’s extended re-
striction Y ⊆A define
Ui(Y ) := {A
′
i ∈Ai | A
′
i is not strictly dominated in Y}.
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Define now inductively for i ∈ I and k ≥ 0,
U0i (A ) = Ai
U k+1i (A ) =Ui(U
k(A )) for k ≥ 0
U∞i (A ) =
⋂∞
k=0U
k
i (A ).
U∞(A ) is called the maximal reduction. It is the set of profiles of action sets that survive iterated
elimination of strictly dominated action sets (IESDA) in the extended game.
For any extended restriction Y ,U(Y ) =×i∈IUi(Y ) is an extended restriction of every player. Note
that when we defined the operator Ui on player i’s extended restrictions, we allowed A
′
i ∈Ai (instead of
requiring that A′i is in player i’s extended restriction). The following property holds:
Remark 3 For any player i ∈ I and k ≥ 0, U k+1i (A )⊆U
k
i (A ).
We show that Choquet rationalizability is characterized by iterated eliminated of strictly dominated
actions in the associated extended game.
For i ∈ I and k ≥ 0, define Aki = {ai ∈ Ai | ai ∈ A
′
i for some A
′
i ∈U
k
i (A )} and A
∞
i = {ai ∈ Ai | ai ∈
A′i for some A
′
i ∈U
∞
i (A )}. A
k
i are the actions of player i that survive k-levels of iterate elimination of
strictly dominated actions in the associated extended game.
Remark 4 For any i ∈ I, ai ∈ A
k
i if and only if {ai} ∈U
k
i (A ) for any k ≥ 0 and ai ∈ A
∞
i if and only if
{ai} ∈U
∞
i (A ).
We are ready to state our characterization result: level-k Choquet rationalizable actions are charac-
terizes by k-level iterative elimination of strictly dominated actions in the extended game. Moreover,
Choquet rationalizable actions are equivalent to iterative elimination of strictly dominated actions in the
extended game.
Theorem 3 For any finite strategic game, any player i ∈ I, and k ≥ 1, Rki = A
k
i and R
∞
i = A
∞
i .
3.2 Representation-based Rationalizability
This section focuses on a special case of a seminal paper by Epstein (1997). He introduced a representation-
based rationalizability concept for games with general preferences. Although his class of preferences
include Choquet expected utility, the case of Choquet expected utility has not been developed rigorously.
We fill in the details.
To defined Epstein’s (1997) representation-based notion for the case of Choquet rationalizability, let
Rui(A−i) be the set of Choquet expected utility functions evaluating acts defined on A−i given the utility
function ui on outcomes in X . Moreover, we write R
ui(A−i | E) for player i’s set of Choquet expected
utility functions that believe the event E ⊆ A−i. More precisely, R
ui(A−i | E) is the set of Choquet
expected utility functions that correspond to a preference  for which the event E is -believed.
Definition 11 (Representation-based) For i ∈ I, define inductively,
E0i = Ai
and for k ≥ 1,
Eki =
{
ai ∈ Ai : There exist CEUi ∈R
ui(A−i | E
k−1
−i ) s.t. CEUi( f
ai)≥CEUi(g) for any g ∈F
Ai
}
.
The set of representation-based Choquet rationalizable actions is defined by
E∞i =
∞⋂
k=0
Eki .
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Epstein (1997) also provided an alternative “fixed”-point definition, which we phrase for the case of
Choquet expected utility as follows:
Definition 12 (Fixed-point definition) Define (Ei)with Ei⊆Ai for i∈ I to be the largest set such that for
every ai ∈Ei there exist a Choquet expected utility function CEUi ∈R
ui(A−i | E−i) such that CEUi( f
ai)≥
CEUi(g) for all g ∈F
A−i .
Epstein (1997, Theorem 3.2) implies the equivalence of both notions:
Theorem 4 (Epstein, 1997) For any finite strategic game and any player i ∈ I, Ei = E
∞
i for all i ∈ I.
We verify that Epstein’s notion applied to the case of Choquet expected utility is indeed equivalent
to our notion Choquet rationalizability.
Theorem 5 For any finite strategic game, any player i ∈ I, and k ≥ 1, Rki = E
k
i and R
∞
i = E
∞
i .
4 Common Belief in Choquet Rationality
In this section, we provide an epistemic characterization of Choquet rationalizability. To this end, we
introduce type spaces that allow us to formalize each player’s belief over other player’s behavior, their
beliefs, etc.
Fix a game in strategic form 〈I,(Ai),(ui◦oi)〉. A capacity-type space is a tuple 〈(Ti)i∈I ,(si)i∈I ,(τi)i∈I〉
with Ti being player i’s measurable space of types, si : Ti −→ Ai a measurable strategy mapping, and
τi : Ti −→ C (T−i) being player i’s measurable type mapping that maps each type to a capacity over
opponents’ types. The strategy mapping si should not be interpreted as an object of choice of player i.
Rather, it is just a device that allows us to specify for each type which action she plays.
For any measurable space 〈Ω,ΣΩ〉, we consider 〈C (Ω),ΣC (Ω)〉 as a measurable space for which the
σ -algebra ΣC (Ω) is generated by sets {ν ∈ C (Ω) : ν(E)≥ x} for E ∈ ΣΩ and x ∈ [0,1]. Note that for any
event E ∈ ΣΩ, the set of capacities that believe E is a measurable set in ΣC (Ω).
For the following exposition, unless noted otherwise, fix a capacity type space 〈(Ti)i∈I ,(si)i∈I ,(τi)i∈I〉
for a game in strategic form 〈I,(Ai)i∈I ,(ui ◦oi)i∈I〉.
Type ti’s conjecture over A−i is defined by τi(ti)|A−i (E) := τi(ti)
(
(s−i)
−1(E)
)
for any E ⊆ A−i. This
is well-defined since for any j ∈ I, s j is measurable.
In light of Proposition 1 (ii), we define:
Definition 13 Type ti believes the event E ∈ ΣT−i if τi(ti)((T−i\E)∪F)= τi(ti)(F) for all events F ∈ΣT−i ,
F ⊆ E.
To save space, we mention without stating details that the epistemic characterization is facilitated
by standard properties of beliefs such that necessitation, monotonicity, and conjunction. Last property
requires that capacities are lower continuous.
Next we define Choquet rationality and level-k mutual belief in Choquet rationality as well as Cho-
quet rationality and common belief in Choquet rationality.
Definition 14 For i ∈ I and k ≥ 1, define inductively,
B1CRi =
{
ti ∈ Ti : si(ti) is a Choquet best response to τi(ti)|A−i
}
Bk+1CRi =
{
ti ∈ B
kCRi : ti believes B
kCR−i
}
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The set of player i’s types that satisfy Choquet rationality and common belief in Choquet rationality is
CBCRi =
∞⋂
k=1
BkCRi
Compared to the definition of Choquet rationalizability, Definition 14 is an epistemic (or better dox-
astic) notion as it is stated at the level of types that capture player’s beliefs about other players. Char-
acterizing both notions in terms of the other would provide an epistemic foundation for Choquet ratio-
nalizability in terms of Choquet rationality and common belief in Choquet rationality. That is, we seek
to show that any type satisfying Choquet rationality and common belief in Choquet rationality takes a
Choquet rationalizability action and for any Choquet rationalizable action there exists a type satisfying
Choquet rationality and common belief in Choquet rationality that takes this action. Of course, this
epistemic characterization would be relative to the type space. It pertains only to beliefs captured by
some type in the type space. A characterization obtained in a particular type space may fail to hold in
a different type space. Thus, it is desirable to provide such an epistemic characterization in rich type
spaces.
For lack of space, we omit details showing that without continuity assumptions on capacities there
does not exist a rich type space (in the sense of beliefs-completeness a` la Brandenburger, 2003 or Bran-
denburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler, 2008).
In order to facilitate modeling rich spaces that capture beliefs about beliefs about etc. in a setting
of measurable spaces, we impose a stronger continuity assumption on capacities that is satisfied auto-
matically in the finite case. Formally, from now on, for any measurable space (Ω,ΣΩ) with σ -algebra
ΣΩ, denote now by C (Ω) the set of continuous capacities on Ω. A capacity ν : ΣΩ → R is continuous
if for any increasing (resp. decreasing) sequence of measurable sets {En}, En ∈ ΣΩ for n= 1,2, ..., with
E1 ⊆ E2 ⊆ ... (resp. E1 ⊇ E2 ⊇ ...) and
⋃
nEn = E (resp.
⋂
nEn = E), we have limn→∞ ν(En) = ν(E).
Again, we view continuity of capacities as a technical assumption. While it is possible to character-
ize it in terms of the underlying Choquet expected utility preference, it is essentially impossible to test
behaviorally. Thus, it makes sense to just state in at the level of capacities.
Without presenting details we mention that continuous capacities allow for monotone continuous
Choquet representations. Applying results on the existence of universal representation type spaces in the
measurable case for general monotone continuous representations from Heifetz, Ganguli, and Lee (2016)
allow us to show the existence of the universal CEU-representation type space. In a second step, we map
the structure of the collection of CEU-representation type spaces and type morphisms to the collection of
continuous capacity type spaces and type morphisms using ideas from category theory. This allows us to
claim the existence of the universal capacity type space in the case of measurable spaces and continuous
capacities.5
The following analysis takes place in the universal capacity type space.
Theorem 6 For i ∈ I, k = 1, ..., Rki = si(B
kCRi). Moreover, R
∞
i = si(CBCRi).
Previous versions of Theorem 6 appeared in the seminal paper by Epstein (1997) using a representation-
based notion of rationalizability (also mentioned in the working paper by Ghirardato and Le Breton,
1999). As mentioned earlier, he considers a rationalizability notion for a general classes of preferences.
Although his general approach allows for Choquet expected utility, he did not show the result for Choquet
expected utility players in particular and the version of Choquet expected utility required in the context
5See Epstein and Wang (1996), Heifetz and Samet (1998), Ahn (2007), Di Tillo (2008), and Pinter (2012) for related work.
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of games had not been developed in 1997. We know from epistemic literature that restrictions on pref-
erences and beliefs may pose challenges for characterizations. Essentially we show that restricting his
classes of preferences to Choquet expected utility does indeed allow for the characterization. His result
is still not a generalization of ours since he considers the topological case while we consider the mea-
surable case. Moreover, instead of a type space commonly considered in game theory he worked with
a utility representation type space introduced in Epstein and Wang (1996). Such a representation-based
type space is very sensible when working with general preferences. Yet, in order to facilitate comparison
with results in the probabilistic case, it is also useful to have a characterization at the level of capacity
type spaces. So we view our results as complementary to his.
5 Common Belief in Ambiguity Attitudes
The family of Choquet expected utility preferences is a rich model that allows to accommodate ambiguity
and players’ attitudes towards it. In decision theoretic terms, an individual displays aversion (resp., love)
towards ambiguity if she prefers (resp., dislikes) an act that (state-wise) averages utilities of outcomes of
two acts to the less favorable act among the two.
To formalize ambiguity attitudes, we use the technique of “preference averages” introduced by Ghi-
rardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Siniscalchi (2003). Call an event E ∈ ΣΩ essential if x ≻ xEy ≻ y
for some x,y ∈ X . An act xEy that returns an outcome x on E and y on Ω\E is called a bet. The certainty
equivalent of xEz is denoted by c(xEz) ∈ X and defined by xEz∼ c(xEz).
We define as in Ghirardato et al. (2003):
Definition 15 Let E be an essential event. Given x,y ∈ X, if x% y we say that a consequence z ∈ X is a
preference average of x and y (given E) if x% z% y and
xEy∼ (c(xEz))E (c(zEy)) .
If x% y, z is said to be a preference average of x and y if it is a preference average of y and x.
“Subjective mixtures” of acts can be defined state-wise. For each f ,g ∈ F and α ∈ [0,1], define
α f ⊕ (1−α)g to be the act that returns α f (ω)⊕ (1−α)g(ω) = z in state ω ∈ Ω where z satisfies
f (ω)Eg(ω)∼ (c( f (s)Ez))E (c(g(s)E z))
for some essential event E .
Now, we can define the standard notions of ambiguity attitudes using subjective mixtures:
Definition 16 (Ambiguity Attitudes) Let % be a preference relation on F . For any f ,g ∈F and any
α ∈ (0,1], the preference relation % is ambiguity averse if,
f ∼ g implies α f ⊕ (1−α)g% f .
The preference relation % is ambiguity loving if
f ∼ g implies α f ⊕ (1−α)g- f .
Notice that a preference relation % is ambiguity neutral (i.e., it coincides with the SEU form) if %
is both ambiguity averse and loving. Attitudes towards ambiguity revealed by Choquet preferences are
closely related to the form of capacities.
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Definition 17 (Convex/concave capacity) A capacity ν : ΣΩ −→ R is said to be
(i) convex, if ν(E)+ν(F)≤ ν(E ∪F)+ν(E ∩F); and
(ii) concave, if ν(E)+ν(F)≥ ν(E ∪F)+ν(E ∩F),
for all events E,F ∈ ΣΩ.
The following result is analogous to Schmeidler (1989) and Wakker (1990). Ambiguity aversion
(resp., love) is characterized by convex (resp., concave) capacities.
Proposition 4 Let % be a Choquet expected utility preference relation on F with respect to a capacity
ν . Then, % is ambiguity averse (resp., loving) if and only if ν is convex (resp., concave).
Let C ri(A−i) be the set of all capacities that satisfy restriction ri ⊆ {conv,conc,add} that stand for
concave, convex, and additive capacities (i.e., probabilities), respectively.
Define restricted Choquet rationalizability (henceforth, the r-Choquet rationalizability) as follows:
Definition 18 (r-Choquet rationalizability) For i ∈ I, r= (ri)i∈I with ri ∈ {conv,conc,add}, and k≥ 1
define inductively,
C
r,1
i = C
ri(A−i)
R
r,1
i =
{
ai ∈ Ai : there exists νi ∈C
r,1
i for which aiis a Choquet best response
}
...
C
r,k+1
i =
{
νi ∈C
r,k
i : νi((A−i \R
k
−i)∪F) = νi(F) for all F ⊆ R
k
−i
}
R
r,k+1
i =
{
ai ∈ Ai : there exists νi ∈C
r,k+1
i for which ai is a Choquet best response
}
The set of r-Choquet rationalizable actions is
R
r,∞
i =
∞⋂
k=1
R
r,k
i .
Although we allow players to display different ambiguity attitudes in the above definition, we are
mainly interested in “symmetric” restrictions in which ri = r j for all i, j ∈ I. In such a case, we simply
write r = conv, r = conc, or r = add. add-Choquet rationalizability is just standard rationalizability a` la
Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984).
As the next example demonstrates, the set of Choquet rationalizable actions might expand under
ambiguity aversion as compared to the set of rationalizable actions a` la Bernheim (1984) and Pearce
(1984).
Example 1 (Coarsening under Ambiguity Aversion) Consider the game of Example 1. When both
players are ambiguity neutral (i.e., r = add), it is easy to verify that
R
add,∞
1 = {u,d} and R
add,∞
2 = {l,r}.
This is the case of standard rationalizability a` la Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984). For Rowena, u is
first-level rationalizable with a probabilistic belief puts probability larger equal than 1
2
that Colin plays
l. Similarly, d is first-level rationalizabile with respect to a belief that puts probability larger equal than
1
2
that r is played. However, there is no probability measure that rationalize choosing m. For Colin, a
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is first-level rationalizable with a belief that assigns sufficiently high probability to Rowena’s action u,
wheres b is first-level rationalizable with belief that assigns sufficiently high probability to action d. The
same arguments apply for any level k ≥ 2.
Now suppose that Rowena is ambiguity averse with a convex capacity over {a,b}. Since convexity
contains the additive case, u and d are rationalizable at the first level. Furthermore, convex capacities
rationalize playing m. In particular, for any capacity ν1 such that ν1(a),ν1(b) ∈ [0,
1
2
), actions m is
Rowena’s best response. Since the reasoning repeats at any level k≥ 2, the set of Choquet rationalizable
actions under convexity is
R
conv,∞
1 = {u,d,m} and R
conv,∞
2 = {l,r}.
Battigalli et al. (2016) present a similar example using the smooth ambiguity model.
However, the set of Choquet rationalizable actions under ambiguity love coincides always with the
set of rationalizable actions under additivity.
Proposition 5 For each player i ∈ I, Rconc,∞i = R
add,∞
i ⊆ R
conv,∞
i .
Both ambiguity aversion or ambiguity love encompass ambiguity neutrality as a special case. We are
also interested in behavior that is rationalizable under genuine “strategic” ambiguity. Player’s ambiguity
attitudes are mute unless they perceive ambiguity. We say that player i perceives genuine “strategic”
ambiguity about her opponents’ strategic behavior if her beliefs on the algebra of action profiles ΣA−i are
non-additive, i.e., there are, at least, two disjoint sets E,F ⊆ A−i for which νi(E)+ νi(F) 6= νi(E ∪F).
It can be shown that given a Choquet expected utility preference  w.r.t. to capacity ν , if ν is convex or
concave, then ν satisfies non-additivity if and only if it does not satisfy additive-separability as stated in
Proposition 2.
To explore r-Choquet rationalizability for r = (conv,na) or r = (conc,na), where na stands for non-
additivity, let us consider again the prior example. Clearly, each action of Rowena is Choquet rational-
izable with respect to a convex and non-additive capacity. That is, R
(conv,na),∞
1 = {u,d,m}, showing that
the set of Choquet rationalizable actions under ambiguity aversion and strategic ambiguity coarser than
under rationalizability a` la Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) with probabilistic beliefs.
The next example demonstrates that Choquet rationalizability under ambiguity love and strategic
ambiguity refines the set of rationalizability actions a` la Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) with prob-
abilistic beliefs.
Example 2 (Refinement under Ambiguity Love) Consider the following game:
u
Rowena d
m
Colin
l r
4,0 0,4
0,4 4,0
2,1 2,1
Rowena’s actions a and d are first-level rationalizable with probabilities that assign a sufficiently
large mass to action l and r, respectively. Moreover, action m is rationalizable with a uniform probability
measure over {l,r}. Thus, when both players are ambiguity neutral,
R
add,∞
1 = {u,m,d} and R
add,∞
2 = {l,r}. (5)
Now suppose that both players are ambiguity loving with a concave and non-additive capacity, i.e.,
r = (conc,na). For Rowena, there is no such a capacity that would rationalize m at the first level.
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Thus, R
(conc,na),1
1 = {u,d} and C
(conc,na),1
1 = {ν1 ∈ C
(conc,na)({r, l}) | ν1(r),ν1(l) ∈ (
1
2
,1]}. For Colin,
R
(conc,na),1
2 = {r, l} and C
(conc,na),1
2 = C
(conc,na)({u,d,m}). At the second level, R
(conc,na),2
1 = {u,d} and
R
(conc,na),2
2 = {l,r}, and so on. Therefore,
R
(conc,na),∞
1 = {u,d} and R
(conc,na),∞
2 = {l,r}.
The examples demonstrate that Choquet rationalizability with ambiguity aversion (resp., love) to-
gether with strategic ambiguity may yield coarser (resp., finer) sets of actions than the than under ratio-
nalizability a` la Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) with probabilistic beliefs. Yet, this is not generally
the case. In particular, the notion of r-Choquet rationalizability when r = (conv,na) or r = (conc,na) is
highly deficient as the next example demonstrates.
Example 3 (Non-Existence under Ambiguity Aversion) Consider the following game:
u
Rowena d
m
Colin
l r
4,0 0,4
0,4 4,0
4,2 4,1
When both players are ambiguity neutral, then R
(add),∞
1 = {u,d,m} and R
(add),∞
2 = {l,r}.
Now suppose that Rowena is ambiguity averse with respect to a convex and non-additive capacity on
{l,r}. At the first level, there is no capacity in C
(conv,na),1
1 ({a,b}) that could rationalize playing u and
d, respectively. Thus, R
(conv,na),1
1 = {m}. At the first level, both Colin’s actions are rationalizable with
respect to convex and non-additive capacities, i.e., R
(conv,na),2
1 = {a,b}. At the second level, R
(conv,na),1
1 =
{m} and C
(conv,na),2
1 = C
(conv,na)
1 ({a,b}) for Rowena. However, at the second level, Colin who has a
convex and non-additive capacity does not believe that Rowena is Choquet rational, thus
R
(conv,na),∞
2 = { /0}.
We also have but do not report here an example for the case of ambiguity love and non-additivity.
These examples demonstrate that a Choquet expected utility maximizer with non-additive beliefs may be
incapable to believe that her opponents play a “single” action profile, even though all strategic uncertainty
could be eliminated (i.e., when the only rationalizable action profile of the opponent players is a singleton
set). Therefore, requiring beliefs to be non-additive at any level of reasoning may unnatural as it assumes
that strategic ambiguity can never be “resolved” at some level.
Recall that an event is believed if and only if it is unambiguous events with the capacity value of 1
(see Proposition 3). It is thus not surprising that a singleton is believed if and only of the Choquet ex-
pected utility preference is subjective expected utility preference with respect to a degenerate probability
measure. Whenever a singleton is believed, there is neither ambiguity nor uncertainty.
Corollary 1 Fix a player i ∈ I and let %i her Choquet expected utility preference. Suppose that at some
level k, the opponents’ set of rationalizable actions is a singleton set, i.e., R∞−i = {a−i}. Then, player i
believes R∞−i if and only if %i is a subjective expected utility preference.
Adam Dominiak and Burkhard C. Schipper 153
References
[1] Ahn, D. S. (2007). Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs, Journal of Economic Theory 136, 286–301,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.08.004.
[2] Aryal, G. and R. Stauber (2014). Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players, Economic
Theory 57, 1–40, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0828-9.
[3] Battigalli, P., Cerreia-Vioglio, S., Maccheroni, F., and M. Marinacci (2016). A note of comparative ambiguity
aversion and justifiability, Econometrica 84, 1903–1916, https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA14429.
[4] Bernheim, D. (1984). Rationalizable strategic behavior, Econometrica 52, 1007–1028,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911197.
[5] Brandenburger, A. (2003). On the existence of a “complete” possibility structure, in: Dimitry, N., Basili, M.,
and I. Gilboa (Eds.), Cognitive processes and economic behavior, Routledge: London, 30–34.
[6] Brandenburger, A., Friedenberg, A., and J. Keisler (2008). Admissibility in games, Econometrica 76, 307–
352, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2008.00835.x.
[7] Chateauneuf, A. (1994). Modeling attitudes towards uncertainty and risk through the use of Choquet integral,
Annals of Operations Research 52, 3–20, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02032158.
[8] Chateauneuf, A., Eichberger, J., and S. Grant (2003). A simple axiomatization and con-
structive representation proof for Choquet expected utility, Economic Theory 22, 907 – 915,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0345-0.
[9] Chen Y.C. and Luo X. (2012). An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences,
Economic Theory 51, 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0596-0.
[10] Chew, S.H., and E. Karni (1994). Choquet expected utility with a finite state space: Commutativity and act-
independence, Journal of Economic Theory 62, 469–479, https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1026.
[11] Choquet, G. (1954). Theory of capacities, Annales Institut Fourier 5, 131–295,
https://doi.org/10.5802/aif.53.
[12] Dominiak, A. and J.-P. Lefort (2011). Unambiguous events and dynamic choquet preferences, Economic
Theory 46, 401–425, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0512-7.
[13] Di Tillo, A. (2008). Subjective expected utility in games, Theoretical Economics 3, 287–323,
https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20080287/0.
[14] Dominiak, A. and J. Eichberger (2019). Games in Context: Equilibrium Under Ambiguity for Belief Func-
tions, Virginia Tech.
[15] Dow, J. and S. R. Costa Werlang (1994). Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncer-
tainty: Breaking down backward induction, Journal of Economic Theory 64, 305–324,
https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1071.
[16] Eichberger J. and D. Kelsey (2000), Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria, Games and Economic
Behavior 30, 183–215, https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0724.
[17] Eichberger J. and D. Kelsey (2014), Optimism and pessimism in games, International Economic Review 55,
483–505, https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12058.
[18] Eichberger, J., Kelsey D. and B.C. Schipper (2009). Ambiguity and social interaction, Oxford Economic
Papers 61, 355–379, https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpn030.
[19] Epstein, L. (1997). Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium, Journal of Economic Theory 73, 1–29,
https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2229.
[20] Epstein, L. and T. Wang (1996). ‘Beliefs about beliefs’ without probabilities, Econometrica 64, 1343–1373,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2171834.
[21] Ganguli, J., Heifetz, A., and B.S. Lee (2016). Universal interactive preferences, Journal of Economic Theory
162, 237–260, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.012.
154 Common Belief in Choquet Rationality and Ambiguity Attitudes
[22] Ghirardato, P. and M. Le Breton (1999). Choquet rationalizability, Caltech.
[23] Ghirardato, P., Macheroni, F., Marinacci, M., andM. Siniscalchi (2003). A subjective spin on roulette wheels,
Econometrica 71, 1897–1908, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1555541.
[24] Gilboa, I. (1987). Expected utility with purely subjective non-additive probabilities, Journal of Mathematical
Economics 16, 65–88, https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(87)90022-X.
[25] Haller, H. (2000). Non-Additive Beliefs in Solvable Games, Theory and Decision 49, 313–338,
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026549117322.
[26] Hanany, E., Klibanoff P., and S. Mukerji (2019). Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse
Players, Mimeo.
[27] Heifetz, A. and D. Samet (1998). Topology-free typology of beliefs, Journal of Economic Theory 82, 324–
341, https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2435.
[28] Klibanoff, P. (1996). Uncertainty, decision, and normal-form games, Northwestern University.
[29] Ko¨bberling, V. and P. Wakker (2003). Preference Foundations for Nonexpected Utility: A
Generalized and Simplified Technique, Mathematics of Operations Research 28, 395-423,
https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.28.3.395.16390.
[30] Lo, K.C. (1996). Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty, Journal of Economic Theory 71, 443 - 484,
https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0129.
[31] Lo, K.C. (1999). Extensive Form Games with Uncertainty Averse Players, Games and Economic Behavior
28, 256–270, https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0696.
[32] Marinacci, M. (2000). Ambiguous games, Games and Economic Behavior 31, 2000, 191–219,
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0739.
[33] Morris, S. (1997). Alternative definitions of knowledge. In: Bacharach, M.O.L., Gerard-Varet, L.A., Mongin,
P., Shin, H.S. (Eds.), Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions. Kluwer, 217–233.
[34] Nehring, K. (1999), Capacities and probabilistic beliefs: a precarious coexistence, Mathematical Social Sci-
ences 38, 197–213, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00017-6.
[35] Nakamura, Y. (1990). Subjective expected utility with non-additive probabilities on finite state spaces, Journal
of Economic Theory 51, 346–366, https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90022-C.
[36] Pearce, D.G. (1984). Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection, Econometrica 52,
1029–1050, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911197.
[37] Pinter, M. (2012). Type spaces with non-additive beliefs, Corvinus University.
[38] Riedel, F. and L. Sass (2014). Ellsberg games, Theory and Decision 76, 469–509,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9381-4.
[39] Sarin, R. and P. Wakker (1992). A simple axiomatization of nonadditive expected utility, Econometrica 60,
1255–1272, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2951521.
[40] Schmeidler, D. (1986). Integral Representation Without Additivity, Proceedings of the American Mathemat-
ical Society 97, 255–261, https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9939-1986-0835875-8.
[41] Schmeidler, D. (1989). Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity, Econometrica 57, 571–
587, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911053.
[42] Spohn, W. (1982). How to make sense of game theory, in: Stegmu¨ller, W., Balzer,
W., and W. Spohn (eds.), Philosophy of economics, Springer-Verlag, 239–270,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-68820-1_14.
[43] Wakker, P. (1990). Characterizing optimism and pessimism directly through comonotonicity, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 52, 453–463, https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90043-J.
[44] Wakker, P. (1989). Continuous subjective expected utility with non-additive probabilities, Journal of Mathe-
matical Economics 18, 1–27, https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(89)90002-5.
